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Abstract: Using agriculture input sector as an exemplar, this article assesses
Bangladesh’s efforts towards a market-oriented development approach. It examines the
changing role of the state following the market-based reforms undertaken in this sector
and assesses whether the outcomes of the reforms are sustainable. Findings reveal that,
although the current move towards a market-oriented approach has led to a shift away
from a state-dominated hierarchical structure, it has not been associated with adequate
changes in institutional arrangements, safeguards, and regulation. As a result, despite
notable achievements of the reforms, the sustainability of these successes is in question.
To facilitate participatory, accountable, and sustainable, market-oriented development, the
paper proposes an integrated governance model linking state, business, and civil society.
Keywords: integrated governance, marked-based reforms, sustainable development
INTRODUCTION
In line with the global trend of “reinventing government” based on market
driven policies and structures, developing countries have adopted major
reforms in line with New Public Management principles in the last three
decades. It is argued that these reforms have been more frequent and pervasive in
developing countries than in the developed countries and this has happened
largely at the pressure of international donors (Peters, 2001). This market-led
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shift in the public management system was mainly pursued with the intentions
to enhance performance in terms of efficiency and quality.
However, in pursuing the reforms, there has been a severe oversight of
governance as a critical component for the market approach to work effectively
and improving the institutional capability that many developing countries lack.
As a result, the new state-market relationship has become almost dysfunc-
tional. With recent advocacy for a small state, public-private partnerships and
the role of NGOs as development partners, states in developing countries have
withdrawn from many of their functions and networked or integrated gover-
nance has become a popular term with state, private sector, and civil society
working together on important issues.1 Witte et al. (2002) have described inte-
grated governance as a structure of formal and informal relations to manage
affairs through a collaborative (joined-up) approach between government
agencies or across levels of government. Similarly self organizing networks
have been defined as, “a loose connection of private, public and voluntary
organizations that have common policy interests, exchange specialized infor-
mation and negotiate shared purposes” (Goodsell, 2001: 628).
The concept of integrated governance includes both better integration
between government (inter and intra) and collaboration with other actors to
increase efficiency and improve transparency. It is emphasized that networks
in integrated governance draw their strength from the comparative advantages
of the resources, capabilities, and knowledge of the actors involved (Steets,
2003; Wright, 2000). The potentials of collaborative public management—
that forms the underlying principle of integrated governance—to facilitate the
development of democratic governance are also well documented (Moote
et al, 1997; Petts, 2001; and Cooper et al. 2006).
Although networked governance is not without its criticisms, which
include creation of fragmented systems with little coordination and account-
ability, and the allegations that some networks have become private govern-
ments run by self interested privileged insiders (Goodsell, 2001), its benefit
outweigh its disadvantages. In recent years networked or integrated governance
is gaining importance as governments world-wide are increasingly turning to
opportunities for working jointly to create synergies and be efficient and
effective (Szirom et al., 2002). However integrated governance is yet to
emerge as a functional model in developing countries in terms of efficiency,
transparency, effective coordination, and providing sustainable development.
In this context, this article assesses the changing role of the state and its
role in promoting sustainable market-oriented development in Bangladesh, a
developing country of South Asia, which has been attempting market-based
reforms for about three decades. The article looks at the reforms undertaken in
agriculture sector in particular, as it is one of the important sectors of the
1The terms networked and integrated governance are used interchangeably in this
article.
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economy with political and economic significance and has experienced perva-
sive reforms in the distribution of agricultural inputs, which include fertilizer,
seeds, pesticides, and irrigation equipment.
This article draws upon the findings of an exploratory study conducted
during 2003–2004 investigating the perception of the key stakeholders on the
success of market-based reforms in the agriculture input sector.2 The findings
of this study are used in this article to explore the weaknesses of the existing
governance structure and promote sustainability of the reforms and to propose
an integrated governance model to address these weaknesses.
The article starts by providing a snapshot of the changes in the state-
administered agricultural input system and reviews the performance of the
reforms, highlighting the problems. It then examines the existing governance
structure in the agricultural input sector and discusses its weaknesses and
constraints on achieving sustainable development. The examination of the
governance system in the agriculture sector is designed to propose a workable
model that may be used to identify the constraints of sustainable development
in other sectors as well. The last section thus proposes an integrated gover-
nance model and discusses how this model can address the weaknesses in the
existing system and can lead to sustainable development.
A SNAPSHOT OF THE CHANGING ROLE OF THE STATE 
IN AGRICULTURE SECTOR
Bangladesh initiated a series of reforms to move towards a market-based
economy from the mid-1970s as a result of implementation of structural
adjustment programs, with direct support from the World Bank and the
International Monetary Fund (IMF). The reforms have been most pervasive in
the agricultural input sector, resulting in a shift away from a state-dominated
2The exploratory study had both quantitative and qualitative components investigating
the perception of the key stakeholders on the reform policies. A total of 154 surveys
were conducted with public officials, private traders dealing with agricultural inputs
and farmers. Sixteen semi-structured interviews were conducted with donor agencies
and senior bureaucrats involved with reform policies. The sample for public officials
and private traders was selected using a stratified random sampling approach. Public
officials were selected randomly from three main agricultural institutes among those
who were holding mid-level positions and had the experience of working in both the
state dominated and privatized agricultural input system. In the case of private traders a
total of 16 enterprises/firms dealing in agricultural inputs were selected randomly from
the list of input traders obtained from the Ministry of Agriculture, Bangladesh. The
respondents were selected randomly from these sixteen enterprises. A total of fifty-
four public officials and 43 private traders were surveyed. Farmers were selected using
a clustered sampling approach from the Savar Upazilla of Dhaka district. A total of
57 farmers were surveyed.
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system to a networked, horizontal system. Until the agricultural reforms that
started in the late 1970s, the Bangladesh Agricultural Development Corporation
(BADC), a state agency with branches all over the country, had the monopoly
of sales and distribution of agricultural inputs to farmers, i.e., fertilizer, irrigation
equipment, pesticides, and seeds.
By the early 1990s, agricultural input delivery services had been priva-
tized and these inputs are now being delivered to farmers through a network of
private sector dealers and in some cases NGOs (Ahmed et al., 2000). The
reform policies involved reductions in subsidies and increased private sector
involvement in sales and distribution of agricultural inputs through liberalization,
deregulation, and privatization (Azmat, 2007).
Review of the Reform Measures
The reforms were undertaken with the aim of increasing efficiency of the
input delivery system, increasing access by farmers to inputs at a reasonable
price through increased involvement of private sector, increasing food production
and decreasing the budgetary burden of subsidies (World Bank, 1990). It was
expected that these benefits would “trickle down” and lead to improved food
security, crop sector profitability, and better socioeconomic conditions for
farmers (Azmat, 2007).
Findings of the exploratory study suggest that the reforms are a mixed story
of both success and failure. The reforms have made some notable achievements,
and have achieved their expected outcomes in most cases. Importantly, how-
ever, in cases where the outcomes have been achieved, their sustainability is in
question. It is not the reforms themselves, in the sense of transfer of responsi-
bility from state sector to the private sector, that are under threat; it is increased
production and its related effects, such as improved efficiency, food security,
and farmers’ income and well-being, that are being threatened.
The main achievement of the reforms has been their contribution to
increasing agricultural production. Despite natural calamities, which are a
regular phenomenon adversely affecting agricultural production, Bangladesh
has been successful in changing its state from a food-deficit country to one
which is self-sufficient in food production in a span of less than three decades
(Ahmed, 2001). Ahmed (1995, 2001) argues that, without market reforms, the
country would have reverted to its historical situation of regular food crisis
and high prices. Increased agricultural production has also led to improved
food security conditions. The reforms have also led to the gradual withdrawal
of subsidies and easy access to agricultural inputs.
Although the objectives of the reforms have been achieved, the sale of con-
taminated agricultural inputs at higher prices has emerged as a problem. Recently,
price hikes, shortages in supply, and sale of the contaminated agricultural inputs—
i.e., the fertilizer, seeds and pesticides—have become common and are leading to
D
o
w
n
lo
ad
ed
 B
y:
 [
De
ak
in
 U
ni
ve
rs
it
y]
 A
t:
 2
3:
06
 2
7 
Oc
to
be
r 
20
09
Integrated Governance 833
a series of actions that are undermining the positive impacts of the reforms and are
also threatening their sustainability (Azmat & Coghill, 2005).
The Consumers Association of Bangladesh (CAB) reported that most of the
fertilizers used by farmers were contaminated and substandard (United News of
Bangladesh (UNB), 2007). This is also supported by the findings of the explor-
atory study which reports that the poor quality of the inputs, providing underweight
and sale of the inputs sometimes at higher prices, have been a problem. A large
number of farmers (63.2%) in the survey reported that the quality of the inputs is
not of a higher quality compared to the previous state-administered system. The
prevalence of the sale of contaminated inputs was unchanged under the improved
accountability regime of the caretaker government in power since Jan 07.
The incidences of the sale of contaminated inputs, although not very
severe, are creating a series of actions, bringing into question the sustainabil-
ity of the positive impact of the reforms, as poor quality inputs affect the
micro-nutrient components of the soil, adversely affecting the health of the
soil and its productivity, and leading to decreased yield and loss of soil fertility
and biodiversity (Structural Adjustment Participatory Review International
Network (SAPRIN), 2002). This is not only having a significant, adverse
impact on agricultural yields, it is also creating a relationship of distrust
between farmers and traders, As a result, even after decades of market-based
reforms the private sector has not been able to earn the public’s trust.
In the context of the business environment in Bangladesh in the last three
decades—which has been characterized by corruption and politicization of the
market process compromising the efficiency of the reforms—the successes of
the reforms achieved so far in terms of increasing efficiency, increasing access
by farmers to inputs through increased involvement of private sector, increas-
ing food production, food security, and decreasing the budgetary burden of
subsidies are remarkable.
However, in the wake of recent incidences of irresponsible business
behaviour demonstrated by the private traders involved in the trading of agri-
cultural inputs in terms of selling contaminated, low quality, underweight
inputs, price hikes, and creating artificial crises, the sustainability of successes
of these reforms achieved so far are threatened. The sustainability of these
successes needs architecture of a functional networked governance which
remains a challenge for Bangladesh as it has a “complex and entrenched
patron-client nature of social relations that governs many aspects of rural life”
(Bode et al., 2005:6). This has led to the prevalence of connected clientilism
which distorts the very essence of networked governance.
THE EXISTING GOVERNANCE MODEL IN THE INPUT SECTOR
The agricultural input sector in Bangladesh has experienced traditionally a
very strong state role and a conventional governance model at the starting
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point where the state was responsible for the distribution of all agricultural
inputs to farmers through the state network. After reforms, the system
changed from a single-channeled delivery system to a complicated arrange-
ment of multiple providers, including the state, the private sector, and NGOs
(Azmat, 2007). Under this partnership arrangement, the private sector and
NGOs now deliver agricultural inputs which were once the exclusive domain
of state organizations. The state now has the responsibility of regulating these
private providers to ensure that they take the interests of farmers into account.
Reforms in the agriculture input sector have been successful to some
extent in creating: the necessary platform of a market in terms of creation of
the concept of market; some awareness among people to view the market as
an alternative service delivery mechanism; institutional changes; distribution
networks, and the necessary infrastructure (Azmat & Coghill, 2005). While
there have been changes in the inbound input distribution side of governance
structure, there have not been enough changes in the outbound demand
system, including institutional arrangements, safeguards and regulation to
support the private sector-led development.
Figure 1 shows the existing governance model in the operation of the
reform policies which includes the three components of governance, i.e., the
Figure 1. Existing model of governance in the input sector.
KEY PLAYERS                                       CONSTRAINTS                            OUTCOMES
 State 
Private
Sector
Civil
Society
Donors
Lack of Good 
Governance:
 -Accountability
 -Transparency 
 -Corruption 
 -Rule of law 
 -Regulatory quality
Lack of Capacity and 
Awareness Building 
-Monitoring 
-Training
-Credit 
-Infrastructure
-Complementary role of 
the state 
-Responsible business 
practices
-Empowerment
Lack of Access to 
Market Information 
Irresponsible
business
practices
Sustainability 
of the positive 
effect of the 
reforms under 
threat
Note:                                   Dotted line indicates weak interaction/ coordination 
                         Solid line indicates strong influence 
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state, the private sector and civil society. The existing model is a departure
from what Bangladesh had in 1970s. Although there have been considerable
changes, the existing system, which involves the state, the private sector and,
in some cases, NGOs remains very different to integrated governance as
discussed below. This model is based on three dimensions, namely, the key
players, the constraints, and the outcomes.
Key Players
As shown in Figure 1, the key players currently involved in the input sector
are: the state, the private sector, civil society, and the donors.
State
The state in this case represents the government organizations and departments
involved in the input sector. According to Goodsell (2001) in networked
governance, the degree to which public action is distributed among the key
players varies widely. In some cases the government retains its dominance
while in other cases private actor networks are prolific. In the case of the agri-
culture input sector, following the reforms, the state has largely withdrawn
from the input sector, although in some cases it still retains authority and dom-
inance. The production and import of urea, the main fertilizer used, lies solely
in state hands. The state agency, BADC (a semi-corporatized body), is still
involved with the production/distribution of seeds and the appointment of
fertilizer dealers. The state has made attempts to regulate the input sector
through the regulatory framework.
However, as the findings of the exploratory study suggest, rather than
regulating effectively, the involvement of the state has opened new avenues
and areas for corruption. The prevalence of corruption and a lack of transpar-
ency and accountability have all led to the lack of rule of law (Azmat &
Coghill, 2005). This is further compounded by the weak capacity on the part
of the state to monitor effectively, due to lack of resources, equipment and
skilled personnel. As a result, the laws and rules relating to the regulation of
agricultural inputs are there but are not being effectively implemented.
Private Sector
The private sector includes both private traders dealing in the import, manufac-
ture and distribution of inputs and farmers who are the recipients of the services.
The reforms have resulted in the emergence of numerous small private traders
involved in the trading of inputs. Although their development has been com-
mendable, given the constraints of access to credit, market information, and
infrastructure policies, their lack of responsible business practices has been
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the major deterrent in their success (Azmat, 2008). They are involved in
irresponsible business practices, which include selling contaminated,
underweight agricultural inputs, hoarding, and price hikes. As they have no
previous experience or training, they lack awareness of the importance of
socially responsible business practices for their long term success and cre-
ating a trusted and mutually beneficial relationship with their customers.
The lack of good governance, as evidenced by the prevalence of corruption,
lack of rule of law and lack of regulatory quality have encouraged them to
engage in socially irresponsible business practices (Azmat & Coghill,
2005).
Although there has been increasing recognition of the benefits of involving
stakeholders, farmers in Bangladesh have been neglected. Their ideas and
opinions are never taken into account in the making of new policies or revising
existing policies. There is no farmers’ association or union strong enough to
act as a pressure group. As a result, farmers are not organized enough to create
pressure, negotiate, or bargain. Referring to the importance of stakeholders,
Wright (2000) argues that government needs to interfere and regulate to
protect the interest of the stakeholders who are unorganized and do not have a
voice. This has not been the case in Bangladesh. Although recently the
government has started to involve private sector in policy making; farmers are
still ignored, mainly due to the lack of a farmer’s organization and their low
level of awareness and education.
Civil Society
The NGOs involved with the distribution of inputs and other social services
and the media are represented in civil society. Although the NGOs in
Bangladesh are large and among the best-known in the world, their involve-
ment in the input sector has been limited, and only a few NGOs are involved
with the distribution of seeds and pesticides. Some of the NGOs have grown
too large in size and as White (2006:321) observes, “increased size has inevi-
tably meant increased distance from the grassroots, and the early pioneering
vision has been replaced by an ethics of efficiency and professionalism.” Yet
the role of NGOs in the development of Bangladesh cannot be denied as they
have been effective in targeting the poor and promoting the welfare of the
people through grass-roots initiatives (Lam, 2006).
However, the potential of the NGOs in terms of empowering farmers,
facilitating their access to necessary market information, assisting them with
redress mechanisms, exposing acts of corruption, improving governance, and
contributing to the capacity building of the state, private traders, and farmers,
remains underutilized. There remains considerable scope for involving the
civil society. The challenge for the government, therefore, is to rethink the
partnership, overcome its drawbacks and take advantage of the NGO platform
for effective service delivery.
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Donors
Given the influence of the donors in policy making, the model includes the
donor agencies involved with the reform policies. As shown in Figure 1, the
donors play an active role, and this is indicated by a strong one-way line exert-
ing pressure to adopt market principles unilaterally. Even though the policies
advocated by the donors are wellintended, they do not always bring desired
benefits as they are neither driven by the national government nor do they
involve the stakeholders (Azmat & Samaratunge, 2007). Despite this, the
policies are adopted because of the need for donor funds and also due to the
incapacity of public officials to bargain and negotiate with the donors.
Weaknesses of the Existing System
There are a number of weaknesses of the current model. Firstly, the interaction
and coordination among the three components of governance, i.e., the state,
the private sector, and civil society, required for effective capacity building
and sound governance are weak, as indicated in dotted lines in Figure 1. There
is a need to change the organizational culture of the components of gover-
nance to make them more participative, cooperative, and information sharing.
Secondly, the donors have a strong unilateral influence on the state and
the NGOs, resulting in the dictation of the reforms with little bargaining or
negotiation power of the state and NGOs. As the policies are generally
imposed, there is lack of political and ideological commitment — crucial for the
success of the reform policies. Lack of political and ideological commitment to
market principles generates a chain of actions, including inefficiency, corrup-
tion, non-market means to conduct business, and other governance-related
weaknesses. Brinkerhoff (2000) argues that programs that target civil society
and the private sector can serve to create conditions that reinforce political
will for anti-corruption reforms. In the current system there are no citizens’
observatories, advocacy training to monitor reform performance, or programs
that target civil society and the private sector to reinforce political will or
expose the acts of corruption.
Thirdly, the involvement of stakeholders, particularly farmers, in the
making and implementation of policies is virtually non-existent. In addition a
lack of awareness among private traders, about their responsibilities, and farm-
ers about their rights and redress mechanisms, further exacerbates the problem.
The trust between participating actors is a basic precondition for public value
creation which is lacking in the agriculture sector as the withdrawal of state has
not been balanced by an efficient and responsible private sector.
Peterson (1998: 38) talks about the importance of technology-based
reforms in making government bureaucracies more effective. In this era of
information technology, there have been no coordinated and serious efforts to
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link the rural population with e-government practices to deal with the problems
of information flow and marketing products. Findings of the exploratory study
suggest that lack of access to market information by farmers on price trends,
the poorly developed transport system, the existence of middlemen who help
farmers sell their produce but also exploit both farmers and the buyers by
profiteering, and the lack of awareness among farmers of their rights are all
creating an unfavorable system for farmers, preventing them from realizing
the benefits of increased production.
Constraints of Sustainable Development
Emphasizing the importance of governance, Werlin (2003) argues that the
difference between rich and poor countries is due to governance rather than
resources. He further introduces political elasticity theory to explain unre-
solved governance issues relating to decentralization, corruption, democracy,
culture, and globalization in developing countries. Political elasticity depends
partly on political hard wares that include regulation, procedures, and technol-
ogy and mostly on political soft wares that include policies and practices. The
success of political soft wares depends on a number of factors which include
establishing acceptable goals, hiring competent people, encouragement, moti-
vation, delegation etc.
The findings of the exploratory study present strong arguments that in the
case of Bangladesh agriculture sector, the main problems lie with governance.
A number of factors account for political inelasticity which include the failure
of the government to deal with the problems of irresponsible business practices,
building awareness among the farmers about their rights, lack of capacity
building, monitoring, and providing access to market information.
The main constraints on the successful implementation of the policies and
on the private sector’s capacity to develop as genuine traders in the input
sector centre on governance issues (Figure 1). As the indicators of governance
are interrelated, lack of accountability and transparency is leading to preva-
lence of corruption and lack of rule of law. Marquette (2007) explains that
when people cannot rely on the existing system of rules, they usually seek out,
as a substitute, networks founded on personal contacts, and this leads to
patronage and “clientelism,” thus creating a vicious cycle. This seems to jus-
tify the connected clientilism prevailing in Bangladesh. Private traders are less
constrained to behave responsibly in this type of business environment.
In addition, the findings of the exploratory study further suggest that
unstable policies and changes in policies with the change of regimes have also
driven private traders towards irresponsible practices. Private traders focus on
making quick profits, as the continuity of policies is not certain. All these lead
to a lack of responsible business culture which is threatening the success and
sustainability of the positive effects of the reforms.
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Findings of the study further suggest that, in addition to governance
issues, lack of capacity, and awareness building of private traders and farmers
are other factors acting as constraints on sustainable development in this sector.
Marquette (2007) argues that civic education is instrumental in changing atti-
tudes towards corruption and civic behavior, yet the capacity for wide-ranging
citizenship education does not exist in developing countries.
Although the work of NGOs has been commendable in terms of increasing
the level of literacy and awareness in Bangladesh, much still remains to be
done. In most cases, farmers are not aware of the rules and regulations and
even redress mechanisms in cases of services not meeting their expectations.
Even private traders in most cases remain ignorant and uninformed about their
responsibilities in the changed context, the regulations in place, and the coer-
cive measures in cases of non-compliance.
Lack of access to market information is also acting as a constraint on
sustainable development. Due to lack of access to market information and
infrastructure facilities, farmers depend on middlemen to sell their produce
and thus are deprived from earning more profit.
In the context of input sector, the coordination of the three players—i.e.,
the state, the private sector, and civil society in terms of effective monitoring,
providing training to both farmers and private traders about responsible
business practices and creating awareness, providing access to credit and
infrastructure facilities—has been weak and not adequately effective. As the
manpower, funds, and facilities are beyond the capacity of each player it is
almost impossible for any one of them to deal with the production, procure-
ment and delivery of inputs on their own. There is therefore a need for coordi-
nation among all the players for monitoring, capacity building and effective
service delivery. The production and supply of the required amount of quality
inputs to the farmers at right time needs an integrated approach between
BADC, the private sector, and the NGOs. The integrated approach could also
lead to more effective implementation of policies, and more responsive
service delivery than is achieved in the current context where the players are
working either in isolation or with undirected and uncommitted interaction.
Outcomes
As the environment in this sector is not conducive to success, the reforms
have not been able to sustain their positive outcomes. The main constraints, as
mentioned, have been poor governance, lack of access to market information
and lack of capacity and awareness building. All these constraints have led to
irresponsible business practices, which not only prevent the reforms from
reaching their potential but also threaten the sustainability of their positive
effects in terms of increased production, improved food security, farmers’
income and well-being, and efficiency of the system.
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Based on the constraints discussed above, the following section proposes
the establishment of an integrated governance model as a possible solution to
a sustainable development.
CONCEPTUAL INTEGRATED GOVERNANCE MODEL: 
A POSSIBLE SOLUTION TO A SUSTAINABLE DEVELOPMENT?
Reform is not an easy and a straight-forward process. It is argued that it is
easy to over-simplify a reform process and it is even easier to completely mess
it up and although the “urgency to find solutions may be real but the search for
a quick fix by those with little knowledge, yet great confidence, is dangerous
and will do real damage” (GWU & World Bank, 2002: 5). Referring to the
importance of integrated governance, Brinkerhoff (2002:524) further argues
that intervention processes conducted jointly by different actors of governance
including the donors could be more efficient and effective as various actors
are able to combine their comparative advantages, expertise, priorities and
values. Based on the weaknesses of the current governance model and the
constraints in the successful implementation of the reform policies, an inte-
grated governance model, as shown in Figure 2, is proposed. In a state where
political processes have failed to introduce an efficient market structure due to
widespread corruption and politicization, functional networked governance
Figure 2. Proposed integrated governance model for collaborative private sector led
agriculture development.
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can create conditions for both bottom-up and top-down governance mecha-
nisms by pooling the resources, knowledge, and capabilities of each player
involved.
The argument for an integrated governance approach is further based on
the fact that such an approach can and has worked in Bangladesh in areas like
education and health and has the potential to solve the problem of contami-
nated inputs in the agriculture sector without introducing other problems. For
example NGOs, the private sector, the state, and donors have been involved in
reforming and restructuring the primary and secondary education system by
increasing institutional capacity. The recent increase in primary enrolment and
education provision for girls can be mainly attributed to the involvement of
NGOs managed by donors like UNESCO. Similarly, in the health sector, the
state and NGOs are collaborating to provide health care especially to vulnerable
populations like women, children and the poor.
These examples above suggest that, in an unwritten way, the networked
governance has been working effectively in multiple sectors in Bangladesh
but they are sporadic and isolated cases. Importantly, there also have been
demands of better coordination and participation of stakeholders and citizens
which form the basis of networked governance. Understanding the importance
of participatory governance, the government also spelled out the need for such
governance architecture and has promised to encourage citizen’s participation
in all services provided by government organizations (Reporter, 2007).
Like the current model, the proposed model is based on four dimensions:
the key players, suggested approaches based on the weaknesses of the current
model and constraints on sustainable development, and the expected and the
projected outcomes.
It is widely recognized that integrated governance provides a more effi-
cient and effective policy delivery (Steets, 2003; Wright, 2000). However it is
also argued that realizing these benefits depend on whether the players
involved understand their roles and responsibilities and also have the capacity
and authority to discharge their responsibility effectively (Wright, 2000) As
shown in Figure 2, the model proposes an integrated participatory approach
between the three components of governance and the donors. The key players
remain the same, but their relationship is proposed to be different from the
existing model. In addition to an integrated and coordinated approach between
the three components of governance, the model proposes a different role for
donors.
Keeping the main constraints of the existing system in view, the main
purpose of the integrated model is to improve: governance, increase access to
and flow of market information; build a well-defined monitoring and support
regime through the involvement of the key stakeholders, pilot e-projects, and
capacity and awareness building. As the top-down bureaucratic approach has
not been effective, the model proposes a bottom-up approach involving the key
stakeholders at the grass-roots level in villages. Rather than working separately,
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the key players are proposed to have an integrated partnership arrangement to
complement each other.
The model emphasizes that the relationship and interaction among the
three players should be complementary and coordinated so that the limitations
of one player are overcome by other players. It not only emphasizes horizontal
and vertical integration within each player but also between different players
in the governance model. Furthermore, a two-way communication is proposed
with the donors, where the domestic spheres should be consulted and involved
in the reform policies and their concerns taken into account, rather than donors
dictating or imposing the reforms. This is important for policy ownership and
political commitment, which are required for the success of the policies
(McCourt; 2002; Khan & Sharma, 2003). In addition, this will also help create
mutual trust among the players, which is essential to make the proposed
model functional.
According to the UN Report (2007), deconcentration is a type of decen-
tralization that involves the transfer of administrative function, roles and
responsibilities from the central to the lower levels and can be sector specific.
One important objective of this proposed model is also to promote effective
deconcentration and delegation by providing the local government involved in
the regulation and distribution of agricultural inputs with adequate administrative
power and authority so that they can act efficiently and effectively without
involving the central government agency (Ministry of Agriculture or BADC)
in normal day-to-day operations.
Another important feature of this model is the bottom-up approach and
the involvement of the important stakeholders at the grass-roots level in the
making and implementing of the policies as explained later. Wright (2000)
talks about the importance of setting up a system of checks and balances, to
give the weak stakeholder groups a formal voice in cases where their interests
differ from others and this system of checks and balances can be established
through integrated governance. It is also argued that civil society organiza-
tions cannot only supplement services provided by the private sector and
maintain a system of checks and balances on government power, but they can
also help to distribute the benefits more equitably within the society by pro-
moting peoples’ participation and organizing them to influence policies (UN
Report, 2007).
As the farmers in Bangladesh are unorganized and do not have a formal
voice, the civil society actors could help in establishing a bottom up approach
that could add capacity to the involvement of the stakeholders in policy and
decision making and the consideration of the interests of the stakeholders.
Further, the integrated partnership between the players will also serve as a
system of checks and balances to protect the interests of the weak stakeholders.
Peters (2001) argues that both the market and participatory governance
models of reform need to have greater openness and more choice for the public.
He further argues that the choices available to the public can be increased by
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providing them access to and increase the information flow about the services
available. This also coincides with the recent trend of emphasis on e-governance
for more citizen-centric governance at reduced costs. An effective partnership
between the players of governance can facilitate the adoption of e-governance
practices to increase efficiency in decision making, distribution, and in reducing
the incidence of corruption and exploitation. Therefore, another feature of this
model includes the development of innovative mechanisms such as e-projects
for effective public policy making and responsive service delivery (see below
for details).
The following section briefly discusses the four dimensions of the proposed
model and how they can contribute to the projected outcomes
Key Players
The key players in the proposed model remain the same, but their relationship
is proposed to be more coordinated and integrated so that they can draw on
strength from the complementarity of knowledge, resources, and capabilities
of other players.
The role of the donors in influencing domestic policies through condition-
ality remains significant, despite the fact that the share of external aid in
development programs has been declining. In addition to advocating a market-
oriented approach, the donors have also involved themselves with the prime
objective of improving governance issues and creating an enabling environ-
ment conducive to private sector-led development. Therefore there remains
considerable scope for the effective participation of donors as well particu-
larly in improving governance and capacity building of the domestic sectors
and providing information flow. The model also proposes to have two-way
communications between the donors and the domestic sectors so that the
national concerns and interests are taken into account.
Suggested Approaches
Participatory Governance
It is argued that “participation plays a crucial role for achieving efficiency, as
it paves the way for integrating people’s needs in public decision-making”
(Steiner, 2007:177). The model in Figure 2 proposes the establishment of
participatory governance at the local level involving the key stakeholders/
players for greater participation, responsiveness and improved quality and
effectiveness of goods and services. Participatory governance leads to more
effective and equitable actions than normally possible through representative
government and bureaucratic administration by inviting citizens to a deep and
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sustained participation in decision making (Kearney et al., 2007). As mentioned
earlier, the elements of participatory governance are already under active con-
sideration by the current government in Bangladesh and the proposed model
has incorporated this concept.
The fundamental assumption of this participatory approach is collaborative
management among the players by facilitating greater individual and collective
participation of the key stakeholders in a meaningful way, who were previ-
ously not involved in policy making. This collective endeavor of the key
stakeholders/players will help the government to find out not only about the
existing problems but also about their demands of the goods and services and
ways of delivering them efficiently and effectively (Peters, 2001). It is therefore
assumed that the proposed participatory approach will also help in promoting
accessibility and clarifying the roles and responsibilities of each player.
Participatory governance attempts to bring together all stakeholders so
that they can be a part of the policies designed and implemented. Realizing the
importance of involving stakeholders, different approaches have been adopted
worldwide to promote participation. A citizens’ charter is one such approach
which was first introduced in the UK in 1991, with the main objectives of
improving service quality and making the public sector accountable by citizens’
participation. Both developed (France, Canada) and developing countries
(India, Malaysia) have established citizens’ charters in line with the British
model, under different names, but essentially with the same purpose. The
effectiveness of citizens’ charter however has been debated. McCourt (2001)
has drawn attention to the indifferent results of citizens’ charters even in
industrialized countries, and argues that they are unlikely to be successful in
developing countries.
Generally, a charter is a part of a new political project under New Public
Management for enhancing government legitimacy and public service and it
therefore requires sustained political support to enhance its success (Cheung,
2005). Peters (2001) further argues that generally citizens’ charters and other
participatory approaches are mandated from top down rather than coming
from bottom up. The proposed participatory governance in the context of the
distribution of agricultural inputs is different from the citizen’s charter, as it is
not concerned with enhancing government legitimacy, nor is it a top-down
approach. Rather it is a bottom-up approach that aims to empower farmers as
customers, educate them about their rights, provide them with a redress mecha-
nism, create awareness among private traders of the importance of consumers
(in this case, farmers), and promote accountability among private traders and
government officials involved in the regulation of the quality and distribution
of agricultural inputs.
Referring to his observations in India, Huque (2005) reports that the realiza-
tion of the objectives of the citizens charter could be affected by the probability
of social exclusion based on poverty and gender discrimination and the top-
down nature of charter implementation. As Bangladesh has a similar context,
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a bottom-up process of involvement of stakeholders, particularly farmers,
regardless of their status and level of education, is proposed. Due to non-
functional democratic process there has been previously little or no involve-
ment of the farmers, as a key stakeholder group, and this in long term has been
acting as a threat for sustainability of reforms.
The participation of stakeholders could have a number of effects which
include: improved transparency, accountability, and responsiveness of the
agencies providing services to farmers; access to simple redress mechanisms
to deal with complaints; a positive impact on controlling corruption and
providing effective regulation; establishing a trusted relationship between
private traders and NGOs (service providers) and farmers (users); and, finally,
leading to empowerment and awareness for both service providers and users
through improved access to information.
The implementation of this charter could be enforced through joint
responsibility of officials of state agencies, private traders and farmers. The
charter could be made simple so that it is understood by all and should be in
keeping with existing rules and laws. As charter is a new concept, the state, the
media, and NGOs could work together in an awareness campaign for its wide
publicity through leaflets, banners, posters and information seminars. There is
also a need for the proper training and orientation of employees responsible for
the implementation of the charter. Seminars or workshops organized jointly by
the state, the private sector and civil society could help to bring the key stake-
holders — farmers, traders, officials of BADC and other agriculture offices,
and the NGOs — onto the same platform, at the village level, to have a dia-
logue and reach consensus on the measurable standards of services provided by
different players. This will also help clarify the roles and responsibilities of
each player involved. As the private sector has been involved in the distribution
of agricultural inputs, the participatory approach could help in involving them
in a continuos dialogue and make them more accountable.
Based on consultation of the stakeholders and taking their insights, sug-
gestions, and concerns into account, and consensus over the details of services
provided by each of the players, a charter could outline the responsibilities of
each player, how and where to obtain service, consumer grievances, redress
mechanisms in the case of services not meeting expectations, and information
about the performance of each stakeholder and how they are performing in
their respective areas of responsibility. Through the increased participation of
farmers, private traders, and public officials, the participatory governance
approach aims to create more transparent, trustworthy, and mutually respon-
sive working relationships among the participants.
Capacity and Awareness Building
The foregoing has proposed participatory governance at the bottom root level
which involves the key stakeholders in the design and implementation of
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policies. Referring to the popular myths and misconceptions about decentrali-
zation, Smoke (2003) argues that greater participation at the beginning helps
in raising the interest of citizens in public affairs and their confidence in holding
the local officials accountable. However, the participation of citizens is not
always easy as Fischer (2006:21) argues, despite much of the rhetoric surround-
ing the discussion of participation, experiences with new forms of participatory
governance show participation to be neither straightforward nor easy.
It is further argued that participation needs to be carefully analyzed, to
facilitate the participation of citizens (Fischer, 2006). In a similar vein,
Robbins et al. (2008) also argue that it is generally assumed that citizens are
altruists and are automatically willing and ready to participate. While this may
hold true in some cases it is less likely to be the case with poor people who
struggle for their survival. In this case as most of the farmers are poor, unorga-
nized with no institutional representation, and not aware about their rights, it
will be difficult to make them participate initially. It is therefore the responsi-
bility of the state, the private traders involved in trading of inputs and the
NGOs to create the awareness among the common citizens about participation
and how that would lead to their empowerment. Civil society actors can play a
significant role in enabling poor farmers to claim their rights as citizens
through forms of collective action, networks and awareness.
According to the United Nations Report (2007:13), “the single most impor-
tant challenge facing governments in the 21st century will be how to strengthen
the institutional capacity of public, private and civil society actors to meet both
the needs of citizens and the requirements of an international economy.” Consis-
tent with this, the findings of the exploratory study suggest that, in the case of
agriculture sector, the capacity of the state to undertake the responsibilities of
effective monitoring remains severely constrained due to lack of adequate finan-
cial resources, trained human resources, and equipment. In most cases, the capac-
ity of the private sector is also severely constrained in terms of lack of access to
funds and necessary infrastructure facilities to undertake investment. This is
another area where a functional integrated governance model could help as estab-
lished NGOs and donor agencies could provide assistance to both state agencies
and the private sector with training, resources and infrastructure facilities.
Market Information
The lack of access to market information has been another major factor
impeding the development of the private sector. Having similar technological,
infrastructure, and legal capacities to Bangladesh, India has successfully
implemented several e-government projects, like Gyandoot and Drishtee, for
developing rural communication and development through intranet-connected
kiosks in villages (Drishtee, 2000; Saxena, 2005). Based on the experiences of
India, Bangladesh could also introduce e-government practices tailored to suit
the needs of rural characteristics of low levels of literacy, low buying power,
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and inadequate infrastructure, power and telecommunications, by re-engineering
existing infrastructure.
The state, with the help of the private sector and NGOs, could take practical
steps to increase access to market information by setting up pilot e-projects in
each village through non-internet technologies, such as mobiles, TV and radio
(in the case of non-availability of internet facilities), so as to provide
(i) commodity marketing information service, i.e., prices, quality and quantity
requirement in surrounding areas;
(ii) extension services/advice, like the use of pesticides, fertilizers, seeds,
new technology, and advice on farming best practices;
(iii) weather information;
(iv) services information — the availability of services in the area, i.e., credit
facilities, labor supply and demand, and
(v) redress of public grievances regarding complaints about substandard
inputs, crises or price hikes of inputs.
Setting up a project like this could have a multitude of advantages. It would
not only help farmers bypass intermediaries, deal directly with end users and
get better sale prices for their products, it could also ensure their access to
extension services regarding the use of inputs and new technologies. They can
also get information on credit and other related services available in the area,
file complaints for poor quality inputs or price hikes, and so on. Access to
information about market conditions, available extensions and other services,
and weather conditions would all lead towards more informed decision making
and empowerment of farmers, and would help make private traders accountable
to their stakeholders.
Expected and Projected Outcomes
It is assumed that the proposed integrated governance model would lead to
participation of the key stakeholders, proper implementation of the charter and
e-projects, and help build the capacity and awareness of the players, and this
would ultimately lead to more transparent, accountable, and responsive ser-
vices. While the participatory approach would keep the government informed
about the demands of the citizens and how the service delivery can be
improved (Peters, 2001), a coordinated and integrated approach could com-
pensate for the weaknesses of each player and help in their capacity building.
All these together are expected to have an effect on improving governance,
access to information, promoting a well-defined monitoring and support system.
This will ultimately lead to establishing responsible business practices, build-
ing effective mutual trust among the stakeholders and promote sustainable
development.
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CONCLUSION
Using Bangladesh agriculture sector as an exemplar, the article has mainly
focused on important issues of developing countries pursuing market-based
reforms. Firstly, it highlights the problems of the sustainability of the positive
effects of market-based reforms which the developing countries have been
pursuing for decades and secondly, the issue of poor governance, the underlying
single most important cause impeding the sustainability of the success of the
reforms.
Drawing on the findings of an exploratory study, this article has assessed the
market-based reforms undertaken in the agricultural input sector of Bangladesh.
Findings suggest that although the reforms have gained success in, increasing
production, providing access to inputs, improving food security, and creating
some awareness on how services and input delivery services can be organized
through market-based reforms, these effects are not sustainable. Price hikes,
shortages in supply and sale of the contaminated agricultural inputs have
become common and are leading to a series of actions that are not only under-
mining but are also threatening the sustainability of the positive effect of the
reforms.
Referring to the attempts of developing countries pursuing market-based
reforms, Peters (2001: 176) argues that despite the appeal of these reforms,
governments require “greater emphasis on formality, rules, and strong ethical
standards” for effective and efficient administration. The importance of a
stable and credible business environment for the successful performance of
the reforms is paramount. As the findings in this case suggest, the main
constraints of sustainable development following the reforms have been poor
governance, lack of access to market information and lack of capacity and
awareness building. The article proposes that integrated governance at the
grass-roots level linking the state, the private sector and civil society can
provide a collaborative platform for constructing the social, political, ethical,
and administrative conditionalities to improve governance. This new partner-
ship with a coordinated and integrated approach would also help in providing
access to market information and support capacity/awareness building of all
the key players by the pooling of their resources, capacities, and knowledge.
The characteristics of Bangladesh in terms of an agriculture base, huge
population, low per capita income, and a weak governance regime are similar
to other developing countries pursuing market-based reforms. As the proposed
model mainly focuses on improving governance issues in the light of
Bangladesh’s experiences, it can be applied to address the governance prob-
lems in other South Asian developing countries as well. Therefore, the main
area of research where this article has aimed at contributing is the potential of
integrated governance to overcome the problems faced by developing coun-
tries pursuing market-based reforms to become a functional market-based
economy.
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